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THE SHIFTING JURISDICTION OF THE
ANTITRUST LAWS
The United States Supreme Court recently construed the inter-
state commerce jurisdictional requirement of three antitrust stat-
utes.' In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co.,2 the Court defined the
so-called "in commerce" requirement of Robinson-Patman Act §
2(a).3 Likewise, in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,4 the Court con-
strued the "affecting commerce" requirement of Sherman Act § 1,1
and in United States v. American Building Maintenance Industries
(ABMI)6 the Court considered the "engaged in commerce" standard
of Clayton Act § 7.7 While the holding in Goldfarb arguably expanded
the jurisdictional scope of Sherman Act § 1, the jurisdictional spheres
of Robinson-Patman Act § 2(a) and Clayton Act § 7 contracted under
the Court's rulings in Copp Paving and ABMI.
Rather than correlating these jurisdictional changes to antitrust
policy goals, the Court based its recent decisions on the language and
legislative history of the individual statutes considered. While the
Court's approach may be defensible on a case-by-case basis, the im-
pact of Copp Paving, Goldfarb and ABMI is not restricted to the
particular statutes construed in each case. On the contrary, the shift-
ing jurisdictional status of each statute will alter both the practical
details of antitrust litigation and the general effectiveness of antitrust
policy.
Robinson-Patman Act § 2(a): The "State Line" Test Applied.
Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act as amended by the Robinson-
Patman Act prohibits price-discrimination in interstate commerce.
There are three requirements to establish jurisdiction under
Robinson-Patman Act § 2(a).8 First, the defendant must be "engaged
I The Constitution granted Congress the power to "regulate commerce with for-
eign Nations, and among the several States ... " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
2 419 U.S. 186 (1974).
3 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970).
95 S. Ct. 2004 (1975).
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
95 S. Ct. 2150 (1975).
7 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
8 Clayton Act § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970), formerly ch. 323, § 2, 38 Stat. 730
(1914). The Clayton Act was amended in 1936 by the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 13(a) (1970), formerly ch. 592, § 1, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936).
The relevant portion of § 2(a) provides:
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in commerce." Second, the particular activity of which the plaintiff
complains must be in the interstate portion of the defendant's busi-
ness. Third, at least one of the items bearing a discriminatory price
must be "in commerce:" The meaning of the latter requirement was
the issue before the Court in Copp Paving?
Prior to Copp Paving, circuit courts were divided on the meaning
of the requirement of Robinson-Patman Act § 2(a) that at least one
purchase in a discriminatory pricing arrangement be "in commerce."
Several courts had indicated that by enacting § 2(a) Congress in-
tended to reach the fullest extent of its power under the commerce
clause. Pursuant to this rationale some courts held that § 2(a)
reached purely intrastate transactions provided they affected'0 com-
merce." The Supreme Court has long held that only the "affecting
commerce" test must be satisfied to invoke the jurisdiction of stat-
utes which are a full exercise of Congress's constitutional power to
regulate commerce.' 2 Other courts, however, took a narrower view in
construing § 2(a) and required that at least one item involved in
discriminatory pricing activity physically cross a state line. This is
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course
of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in
price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and
quality, where either or any of the purchases involved in such discrim-
ination are in commerce ....
419 U.S. at 188.
" The Court has decided that Congress, in exercising its power to regulate com-
merce among the states, may also control any activity, no matter how local, if it affects
interstate commerce. Therefore, an activity need not be "in" interstate commerce to
"affect" commerce and thus be subject to federal control. As the Court stated in Heart
of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States:
Thus the power of Congress to promote interstate commerce also in-
cludes the power to regulate the local incidents thereof, including local
activities in both the state of origin and destination, which might have
a substantial and harmful effect upon that commerce.
379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964). See note 27 infra.
" The following are examples of cases applying the "affecting" commerce doctrine
to § 2(a): Sun Cosmetic Shoppe, Inc. v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 178 F.2d 150 (2d
Cir. 1949); Shaw's, Inc. v. Wilson-Jones Co., 105 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1949); Ford Whole-
sale Co. v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 344 F. Supp. 1323 (N.D. Cal. 1972), aff'd,
493 F.2d 1204 (9th Cir. 1974); General Shale Prods. Corp. v. Struck Constr. Co., 37 F.
Supp. 598 (W.D. Ky. 1941), aff'd, 132 F.2d 425 (6th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S.
780 (1943); Abouaf v. J.D. & A.B. Spreckels Co., 26 F. Supp. 830 (N.D. Cal. 1939).
See also Note, Antitrust-The Jurisdictional Requirements of Robinson-Patman Act
§ 2(a) Clarified: Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., Inc., 32 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 939,
941 n.11 (1975).
1 See note 10 supra.
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the so-called "state line" test.' 3 Copp Paving settled the difference
among the circuit courts by requiring adherence to the "state line"
test.4
Due to the nature of the respondent's business, the Court in Copp
Paving confronted a situation that illustrated the differences between
the "state line" and "affecting commerce" tests especially well. Copp
Paving Co. manufactured asphaltic concrete, or "black top." The two
ingredients of this product were gravel and liquid asphalt. Copp Pav-
ing was required to purchase the latter ingredient from a group of
petroleum refiners, several of which owned corporate subsidiaries di-
rectly in competition with the respondent. 5 Copp Paving alleged two
§ 2(a) violations: first, that the parent corporations charged their
subsidiaries lower prices for liquid asphalt than they did to Copp
Paving; and, second, that corporate subsidiaries directly in competi-
tion with Copp Paving charged lower prices for asphaltic concrete
than those in other geographic markets. The market area in which
petitioners and respondent competed was totally within California.,6
In ruling that Robinson-Patman Act § 2(a) jurisdiction was con-
tingent upon meeting the "state line" test, the Supreme Court relied
upon the legislative history and explicit wording of the statute. 7 The
" Mayer Paving & Asphalt Co. v. General Dynamics Corp., 486 F.2d 763, 766 (7th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146 (1974).
11 The Court thus satisfied a line of lower federal court cases which applied the
"state line" test to § 2(a): Mayer Paving & Asphalt Co. v. General Dynamics Corp.,
486 F.2d 763 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146 (1974); Littlejohn v. Shell Oil
Co., 456 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1972), rev'd on rehearing, 483 F.2d 1140 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 116 (1973); Cliff Food Stores, Inc. v. Kroger, Inc., 417 F.2d 203 (5th
Cir. 1969); Hiram Walker, Inc. v. A&S Tropical, Inc., 407 F.2d 4 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 901 (1969); Abramson v. Colonial Oil Co., 390 F.2d 873 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 831 (1968); Food Basket, Inc. v. Albertson's, Inc., 383 F.2d 785
(10th Cir. 1967); Borden Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 953 (7th Cir. 1964); Willard Dairy Corp.
v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 309 F.2d 943 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S.
934 (1963) (Black, J. dissenting). See also Note, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 939, 942 n.13
(1975).
's 419 U.S. at 189.
" Due to its great weight and its need to be kept at a high temperature, asphaltic
concrete was not a highly mobile product. Therefore, the asphaltic concrete market
was divided among numerous local competitors. To be profitable, a plant apparently
operated within a delivery radius of about 35 miles. As it was used in large amounts
on state controlled construction of interstate highways, it was unlikely that any deliv-
eries would cross a state line. Note, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 939, 943 n.17 (1975).
11 The Supreme Court rejected an analogy of the Robinson-Patman Act's com-
merce requirement with the similar requirements of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
1,2 (1970), and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (1970).
In dismissing any comparison with the Sherman Act, the Court relied first on the
19761
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Court's interpretation of Robinson-Patman Act legislative history
and congressional intent rejected the respondent's argument that §
2(a) should have the same jurisdictional scope as the Sherman Act.'
Rather, the Supreme Court ruled that Congress intended Robinson-
Patman Act § 2(a) to have a narrower jurisdictional requirement than
the "affecting commerce" test. 9 The Court also stressed the differ-
ence in statutory language between Sherman Act § 1 and Robinson-
Patman Act § 2(a), 2 holding that the phrase "in restraint of com-
merce" is more susceptible to an "affecting commerce" interpreta-
differences in the, statutory language of the two acts. See note 65 infra. The Court
further indicated that the differences in statutory language alone showed that Sher-
man Act jurisdiction was keyed more to the broader "affecting commerce" doctrine
than was the language of § 2(a). 419 U.S. at 194.
The second ground for the Court's rejection of the analogy of § 2(a) to the Sherman
Act was its prior decision that in the Sherman Act Congress "wanted to go to the
utmost extent of its constitutional powers." .See note 27 infra. After considering the
congressional history of the Robinson-Patman Act, the Court concluded that the Act
was not intended to exercise the full federal commerce clause power. This was based
on the deletion in 1936 of the phrase "whether in commerce or not" and the substitu-
tion of the phrase "in commerce" in § 2(a). H.R. REP. No. 2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess.
6 (1936). The Court failed to mention that in agreeing to the substitution of "in
commerce" for "whether in commerce or not," the conferees stated: "That [the
"whether in commerce or not" provision] was omitted, as the preceding language
already covers all discrimination, both interstate and intrastate, that lie within the
limits of Federal authority." Id.
There has not been total accord on the significance of the deletion. It has been
suggested that the deletion was merely a defensive reaction to the Court's decision
in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). Note, The Commerce
Requirement of the Robinson-Patman Act, 22 HASrINGs L.J. 1245, 1255 (1971). How-
ever, the conference committee report that explained the deletion expressed the opin-
ion that the wording already embodied the furthest reaches of federal power. If it was
a fear of Schechter, Congress could have used the same "in or directly affecting"
commerce provision that was approved in Schechter. Note, Robinson-Patman Act-
Price Discrimination Between Two Purely Intrastate Sales by a Corporation Engaged
in Interstate Commerce Satisfies the Jurisdictional Requirements of Section 1(a) of the
Act, 86 HARV. L. REV. 765, 771 (1973).
Finally, the Court rejected Copp's contention that § 2(a) should be read in con-
junction with the Fair Labor Standards Act. The Supreme Court found significant
statutory differences between § 2(a)'s "in commerce" requirement and the FLSA
coverage of employees engaged "in commerce or in the production of goods for com-
merce." FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a), 207(a) (1970). The Court decided that the statu-
tory language and congressional history indicated that the "affecting commerce" doc-
trine had to be rejected, and that the "state line" test was appropriate for § 2(a). 419
U.S. at 200.
IR 419 U.S. at 200.
" See note 17 supra.
20 Id.
ANTITRUST JURISDICTION
tion than the "in commerce" language of § 2(a). The Court thus
concluded that in light of the Robinson-Patman Act's restrictive
wording, application of the "affecting commerce" test would only be
appropriate if mandated by express congressional intent.2' Since the
Court found no such intent, it held that § 2(a) claims must satisfy
the "state line" test.
Several ramifications of Copp Paving extend beyond the mere
jurisdictional scope of § 2(a). First, the so-called "underwriting"
theory enunciated in Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co. is no longer a
basis for § 2(a) jurisdiction.? The "underwriting" theory permitted
application of § 2(a) when profits derived from interstate transactions
were used to finance purely intrastate price-discrimination. By re-
jecting this theory, Copp Paving effectively condones the use of inter-
state profits in intrastate price-discrimination. Thus, the ability of a
large corporation to finance the local price wars of its intrastate sub-
sidiaries will go unchallenged.
A second effect of Copp Paving is to give vertically integrated
firms increased opportunities to avoid § 2(a). By requiring the very
item bearing the discriminatory price to cross a state line, Copp
Paving limits § 2(a) enforcement to only those price discriminations
which proceed from a final sales outlet. Thus, the effects of price-
discrimination could be achieved at the manufacturing level with §
2(a) impunity. Likewise, sales outlets could be strategically located
to avoid transactions crossing state lines.? Conversely, small sales
21 419 U.S. at 198.
2 The Court's discussion of Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1954)
emphasized the validity of the "state line" test. That case left the courts divided on
the § 2(a) "in commerce" test, having never clearly decided the issue. One theory was
that it is within section 2(a)'s scope when an interstate company used interstate profits
to supply a local price war. This became known as the "underwriting" theory. The
Court in Copp Paving explicitly labeled this aspect of the Moore case dicta. 419 U.S.
at 201. The Copp Paving Court thus concluded that the only basis for jurisdiction in
Moore was the single bread truck that carried bread across the state line. 419 U.S. at
201. A troublesome case was thus resolved as the Court enunciated a "state line" test.
For a discussion of Moore before Copp Paving, and a history of circuit court decisions,
see Salomon, The Robinson-Patman Act "Commerce" Requirement: The Emascula-
tion of Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread, 8 U. SAN FRAN. L. REv. 497 (1974).
11 The ease with which a large corporation can escape § 2(a) liability can be seen
in an examination of Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co. Note, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
939, 953 n.63 (1975). Mead could have successfully waged a price war against Moore
in Santa Rosa, New Mexico, by merely shipping the lower priced bread from its plant
in Roswell, New Mexico, which was approximately the same distance from Santa Rosa
as Clovis, New Mexico, and yet sufficiently far from the state line to make any inter-
state shipments unlikely. Mead's interstate profits could thus subsidize its price dis-
19761
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firms, or the sales outlets of large firms, face increased exposure to §
2(a) liability in areas close to state boundary lines.24
In at least two ways, then, Copp Paving arguably decreases the
effectiveness of § 2(a). By permitting large vertically integrated com-
panies to avoid Robinson-Patman liability while exposing small busi-
nesses near state borders to increased liability, the Copp Paving
Court produced a result that hardly seems consistent with the pur-
pose of a statute designed to effect broad economic policies.25
Sherman Act § 1: Formalism Replaces Facts.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits "contracts, combinations
or conspiracies in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States."" Traditionally, Sherman Act jurisdiction depended on a
showing that the alleged trade restraint had a "substantial effect" on
interstate commerce.Y In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, the Su-
crimination without any fear of § 2(a) violation. This is the end result of Copp Pav-
ing, yet it is unlikely that this was the intent of Congress.
24 The Fifth Circuit has mentioned that a § 2(a) suit might meet with success in
places such as Texarkana, which stradles the Texas, Arkansas, and Louisiana borders.
Cliff Food Stores, Inc. v. Kroger, Inc. 417 F.2d 203, 210 n.4 (5th Cir. 1969). The
Supreme Court has disapproved use of the commerce clause power to reach activities
in state border town situationhs. NLRB v. White Swan Co., 313 U.S. 23 (1941). In White
Swan, the Court expressed doubt whether Congress intended the use of broad "affect-
ing commerce" doctrine statutes on small border town activities. It expressly ques-
tioned whether the "affecting commerce" jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations
Act in reality extended its broad jurisdiction over local businesses that happen to
operate near a state line.
Congress could amend the statute, a practice it has followed before for antitrust
law. See note 70 infra.
21 Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal ....
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
" The jurisdictional scope of the Sherman Act has expanded in a constant pro-
gression since its inception to the broad scope that exists today. See note 30 infra. The
first Sherman Act case so narrowly construed the Act as to render it useless as effective
antitrust law. United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
The Sherman Act's jurisdiction reached its present broad interpretation by the
Court in United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfrs. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460 (1949).
Defendant trade association and members claimed to be engaged in purely intrastate
commerce. They were charged with inducing jobbers in the women's sportswear indus-
try to employ only association member contractors, all of whom were unionized. The
contractors engaged in the sewing on of buttons and other local activities. The Court
held that it did not matter that the activities when considered alone were intrastate,
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preme Court relaxed the "substantial effect"" test for § 1 and
adopted a formalistic approach to Sherman Act jurisdiction. Since
ruling in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association
that Congress went to the fullest extent of its commerce clause power
in enacting § 1,19 that section's jurisdiction has been linked to an
elastic case-by-case standard." The Goldfarb Court3' held that a state
bar minimum fee schedule for real estate title examinations affected
interstate commerce and therefore satisfied the jurisdictional require-
but that the Sherman Act could reach such activities if there was any effect on inter-
state commerce. The commerce requirement of the Sherman Act was stated as follows:
Restraints, to be effective, do not have to be applied all along the line
of movement of interstate commerce. The source of the restraint may
be intrastate, as the making of a contract or combination usually is;
the application of the restraint may be intrastate, as it often is; but
neither matters if the necessary effect is to stifle or restrain commece
among the states. If it is interstate commerce that feels the pinch, it
does not matter how local the operation which applies the squeeze.
336 U.S. at 464. This has become the classic definition of the "affecting commerce"
doctrine. See also Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320 (1967) (per curiam); United States v.
Employing Plasterers Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186 (1954). Goldfarb can thus be seen as a part
of this progression.
The Supreme Court had long recognized that the effect on commerce must be
substantial before Sherman Act jurisdiction will be obtained. This requirement of a
substantial effect was expressed by the Court on numerous occasions. Burke v. Ford,
389 U.S. 320, 321 (1967); United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfrs. Ass'n, 336 U.S.
460, 464 (1949); Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S.
219, 234 (1948). In discussing the full extent of the commerce clause power of Congress,
the Court in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) stated:
But even if appellee's activity be local and though it may not be
regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached
by Congress if it exerts a substantial effect on interstate commerce,
and this irrespective of whether such effect is what might at some
earlier time have been defined as "direct" or "indirect."
Id. at 125 (emphasis added).
In discussing this requirement in the Sherman Act, the Court in Mandeville Isand
stated the test:
[Tihe vital question becomes whether the effect is sufficiently
substantial and adverse to Congress' paramount policy declared in the
Act's terms to constitute a forbidden consequence.
334 U.S. at 234 (emphasis added).
322 U.S. 533, 538 (1944).
See Eiger, The Commerce Element in Federal Antitrust Litigation, 25 FED. B.J.
282 (1965); Note, The Commerce Requirement of the Robinson-Patman Act, 22
HASTINGs L.J. 1245 (1971).
'1 The district court held that the fee schedule violated the Sherman Act. 355 F.
Supp. 491 (E.D. Va. 1973). The court of appeals reversed. 497 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1974).
1976]
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ment of Sherman Act § 1.32
Petitioner Goldfarb alleged that the Fairfax County, Virginia, Bar
Association minimum fee schedule for real estate title examinations
constituted price-fixing, a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.?
Even though the entire title examination took place within Virginia,
4
the Supreme Court found that it affected interstate commerce and
therefore justified application of the Sherman Act. In so holding, the
Court relied on the theory that if the attorney's title examination was
part of a larger transaction which affected interstate commerce, the
title examination itself also affected interstate commerce for Sher-
man Act purposes. 5
The Court considered the attorney's title examination but a part
of the entire real estate transaction. Significantly, a large portion of
the finance for real estate purchases in the Northern Virginia area
came from outside the state. Furthermore, many of the mortgages
were guaranteed by federal agencies. 6 The Court ruled that the inter-
state origin of the investment capital and the federal mortgage guar-
antees placed the entire real estate purchase within the bounds of the
32 The activities involved were found not exempt from the Sherman Act because
they involved a "learned profession." In addition, the Court decided that respondents
were not exempt under the state action doctrine of Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341
(1943).
1 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
3 The county bar aruged that the aim of the schedule was local and therefore any
restraint could not substantially affect interstate commerce. It further proposed that
there was no showing that the fee schedule actually increased attorneys' fees and that
even if it did increase the fees, there was no proof that such an increase actually
deterred prospective homeowners from buying real estate in the county. The Court
dismissed these arguments as irrelevant to its consideration of whether the minimum
fee schedules violated the Sherman Act.
The Court's opinion started by declaring the title examination to be an integral
part of the interstate real estate transaction. The Court's terse discussion of the effect
on commerce relied on United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293 (1945)
for the proposition that the title examination was not a purely local activity, but rather
was "an inseparable element of a larger program dependent for its success upon activ-
ity which affects commerce between the states." Id. at 297, quoted in 95 S. Ct. at 2011-
12. However this does not answer the question of whether the fee schedule substantially
affected the interstate transaction. For the affecting commerce doctrine that the Court
actually used, whether the title examination was an integral part of the total transac-
tion was not an issue. The substantiality of the effect of the fee schedule for the
examination on the purchase was the issue.
1 The Court's considering the title examination to be an inseparable part of a
larger transaction that in some manner affected interstate commerce has no real bear-
ing on whether the title examination affected interstate commerce. See note 34 supra.
1' 95 S. Ct. at 2011.
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"affecting commerce" doctrine." Because the title research was but
a part of this larger transaction and because the interstate finance
and federal guarantees were contingent on certification of title, the
title examination itself was held to affect interstate commerce for
Sherman Act purposes.38 The Court did not go beyond this theory to
consider the question of whether an attorney's minimum fee schedule
actually had a restraining effect39 on the interstate flow of purchase
money capital." Thus, the Court seems to have implied in Goldfarb
that the mere possibility of an effect on interstate commerce is
enough to satisfy the Sherman Act § 1 jurisdictional requirement.
In at least one respect the Court overlooked a traditional aspect
of Sherman Act jurisdictional analysis. Specifically, the Court
seemed more interested in bringing an acknowledged Sherman Act
violation within the purview of the statute than in an objective analy-
sis of jurisdictional facts. Prior to Goldfarb a two-step analysis was
necessary to establish a Sherman Act violation.4' The first step was
the investigation of jurisdictional facts to determine whether the al-
leged trade restraint had a substantial effect on interstate com-
merce.2 The second step was to ascertain whether the alleged trade
31 Id. at 2012.
3Id.
1, At least one court had no difficulty in finding such an effect. The district court
in Mazur v. Behrens, 1974-1 TRADE CAS. 75,070 at 96,787 (N.D. Ill. 1972) found in a
similar situation an effect to be so logical that no proof was needed. The complaint
alleged a Sherman Act violation by real estate brokers who allegedly conspired to raise
real estate commissions from 6% to 7%. The effect on prospective purchasers was self-
evident:
It is almost self-evident that the increase of a real estate commission
from 6% to 7% (a 16% increase) necessarily burdens the movement of
persons and their effects from state to state.
Id. at 96,788.
48 95 S. Ct. at 2011.
' Ford Wholesale Co., Inc. v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1204 (9th
Cir. 1974); Rasmussen v. American Dairy Ass'n, 472 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 950 (1973); Evans v. S. S. Kresge Co., 394 F. Supp. 817 (W.D. Pa.
1975).
11 In determining the jurisdictional scope of the commerce clause power, the Court
is faced with two possibilities. In many instances, such as in Sherman Act § 1, the
Court has been given no guidance by Congress as to whether an activity affects com-
merce. This is different from situations where Congress has already decided that a
particular activity affects interstate commerce. Compare the Court's search for an
effect on commerce in Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co.,
334 U.S. 219 (1948) with the Court's acceptance of a congressional determination of
an activity's effect on interstate commerce in Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294,
303-04 (1964). Cf. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.. 100, 119-20 (1941).
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restraint violated the Act. 3 Although the Court recognized the bifur-
cated nature of these two lines of analysis," Goldfarb reversed the
order of these steps." By reversing the steps, the Court's jurisdic-
tional analysis relied on facts and precedents relating more to the
existence of a substantive violation than to the jurisdictional requi-
remnt 1
11 Some restraints of trade will not be per se violations of Sherman Act § 1. The
Court must then consider whether the restraint is "reasonable" and therefore not a
violation, or unreasonable and a violation of § 1. Chicago Board of Trade v. United
States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). See P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 343 (2d ed. 1974).
" 95 S. Ct. at 2009.
The validity -of a strict test for jurisdictional purposes and a per se test for
substantive violations of Sherman Act § 1 has been questioned. If an activity is a per
se violation of Sherman Act § 1, it is anomalous to require a strict jurisdictional
showing. United States v. Finis P. Ernest, Inc., 509 F.2d 1256 (7th Cir. 1975); P.
AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 122 (2d ed. 1974).
11 Having decided that commerce was affected for jurisdictional purposes due to
the title examination's relation to the loan transaction, the Court's subsequent rulings
were predicated upon this decision. Therefore, the Court rejected petitioners' com-
plaint that no showing of any deterrence to home buyers was offered by the respon-
dents, thus avoiding the jurisdictional requirement that an activity substantially affect
commerce. It stated that once an effect is shown, magnitude is irrelevant. 95 S. Ct. at
2012. To support this point, Goldfarb relied on United States v. McKesson & Robbins,
Inc., 351 U.S. 305 (1956). However, Goldfarb arguably applied a test for a substantive
violation of the Sherman Act to determine if jurisdiction existed. Only after jurisdic-
tion is established should a court consider if there is a violation. See note 41 supra.
The position of McKesson & Robbins on which Goldfarb relied was aimed at the
required scope of a restraint after jurisdiction had been established. 351 U.S. at 310.
Thus, establishing Sherman Act § 1 jurisdiction was not the concern of the Court in
McKesson & Robbins.
The Court seemingly argued that if an activity is a per se violation, then jurisdic-
tion automatically attaches. This argument has been emphatically rejected. Page v.
Work, 290 F.2d 323 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 875 (1961). In Page, quoting from
Las Vegas Merchant Plumbers Ass'n v. United States, 210 F.2d 732, 747 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 817 (1954), the court stated:
True, a price fixing conspiracy which operates on or within the
flow of interstate commerce affects that commerce as a matter of law.
But a price fixing conspiracy at a purely local or interstate level does
not, as a matter of law, affect the flow of commerce. Whether a purely
local or intrastate conspiracy unreasonably restrains interstate com-
merce is primarily a factual question, i.e., does the local price fixing
conspiracy affect substantially the flow of interstate commerce? If the
answer is yes, then only are we concerned with the effect of price-fixing
under the per se doctrine. In fact, unless there is a finding that the
local and intrastate activities complained of and as alleged in the
indictment [complaint] substantially affected interstate commerce,
there is no jurisdiction in a district court over the alleged Sherman Act
violation.
ANTITRUST JURISDICTION
For some time before Goldfarb, the Court's movement towards a
more formalistic test for Sherman Act § 1 jurisdiction was apparent. 7
In Burke v. Ford," the Court relied more on economic principles than
on quantitative facts to establish the existence of a substantial effect
on interstate commerce. In Burke, the alleged restraint was that
290 F.2d at 331-32. However, the ease with which the Court can find an effect on
commerce may make this requirement a mere formality. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111 (1942). But see note 45 supra.
The Supreme Court also rejected any requirement of proof that the fee schedule
actually raised attrorneys' fees, with analysis on this point similar to the analysis used
on the issue of deterred real estate purchasers. It relied on Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader,
310 U.S. 469 (1940), which emphasized the necessity of a specific showing that prices
were actually affected by the restraint. However, Apex Hosiery indicated the Court's
concern for some showing of an effect on prices when deciding if a restraint is unreason-
able for a substantive violation of § 1 and is not concerned with a jurisdictional
showing. Id. at 500-01.
" In United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfrs. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460 (1949), the
Court expressed the reach of the affecting commerce doctrine as applied to intrastate
activities. See note 27 supra. This was the traditional test for Sherman Act jurisdic-
tion. Las Vegas Merchant Plumbers Ass'n v. United States, 210 F.2d 732, 739-40 n.3
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 817 (1954). Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320 (1967) (per
curiam) and United States v. Employing Plasterers Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186 (1954) perhaps
repudiated the requirement that an actual substantial effect on interstate commerce
be shown before Sherman Act jurisdiction is proper. The Ninth Circuit in Doctors, Inc.
v. Blue Cross, 490 F.2d 48 (3d Cir. 1973) summarized the jurisdictional concern of the
Supreme Court in these two cases:
There is no discussion of "directness" or of the specific relation-
ship between the interstate goods affected and the local market con-
trolled. Nor is there even a concern with the specific magnitude of the
impact on interstate commerce caused by the alleged conspiracy. In-
stead, the Court in each case ends its inquiry when it has satisfied
itself that the logical and therefore probable effect of the alleged act
is to reduce the flow of goods in interstate commerce.
490 F.2d at 53 (footnotes omitted). The concern was with the concept that if overall
activity in a market declines, it is likely that the flow of supplies allegedly affected
will decline. There was no showing of an effect on commerce in either case, merely the
hypothesis of such an effect.
This formalistic argument was expressed by the Ninth Circuit in Rasmussen v.
American Dairy Ass'n, 472 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 950 (1973):
The quantitative effect on the interstate flow of. . . ingredients
is not alleged. But it is the nature of the effect that is important: to
whatever extent, it is certain that the flow of . . . ingredients into
Arizona will be diminished. ...
Id. at 525. Other courts have also discussed the new formalistic approach of the Su-
preme Court. See Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital, 511 F.2d 678 (4th
Cir.), cert. granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3200 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1975) (74-1452); Doctors, Inc. v.
Blue Cross, 490 F.2d 48 (3d Cir. 1973).
4 389 U.S. 320 (1967) (per curiam).
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Oklahoma liquor wholesalers were dividing sales territories to elimi-
nate competition among themselves.49 Despite a showing that sales
of liquor shipped from out of state had actually increased since the
alleged restraint commenced, the Court found Sherman Act § 1 juris-
diction based on the restraint's likely effect on interstate shipments
of liquor. On the facts, no substantial effect on commerce could be
shown. However, the Court reasoned that "[w]hen competition is
reduced, prices increase and unit sales decrease."5 Thus, in Burke as
in Goldfarb, the Court accepted the primacy of antitrust doctrine
over mere showings of fact." The importance of antitrust theory
rather than facts is the basis of the post-Goldfarb formalistic ap-
proach to Sherman Act jurisdiction."
The formalism of the Goldfarb Court leads to several conse-
quences for Sherman Act applicability. First, Goldfarb would seem
to indicate that any transaction financed by interstate loans or guar-
anteed by federal agencies affects interstate commerce for Sherman
Act § 1 jurisdictional purposes. 3 Second, the requirement of a proven
substantial quantitative effect which had been applied by some
courts to Sherman Act jurisdiction 4 is no longer significant. Essen-
tially, then, Goldfarb alters Mr. Justice Jackson's maxim that Sher-
man Act jurisdiction was invoked by any "squeeze" on trade as long
as interstate commerce felt the "pinch."5 5 After Goldfarb, interstate
commerce need scarcely feel the "pinch" to trigger jurisdiction.
"1 A division of markets among competitors is normally a per se violation of Sher-
man Act § 1. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
389 U.S. at 322.
' See note 47 supra.
5 Circuit courts have followed the Supreme Court's trend toward less reliance on
specific effects on commerce for Sherman Act § 1 jurisdiction. See note 47 supra.
A possible objection to this type of analysis is that it does allow the courts to
reach almost totally local activities. However, circuit courts have already refused to
allow this type of analysis go to extremes. Doctors, Inc. v. Blue Cross, 490 F.2d 48 (3d
Cir. 1973); Lieberthal v. North Country Lanes, Inc., 332 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1964); Page
v. Work, 290 F.2d 323 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 875 (1961). However, establish-
ing uniformity in what type of activity is local and what type is interstate may be
difficult. Compare Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital, 511 F.2d 678 (4th
Cir.), cert. granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3200 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1975) (No. 74-1452) with United
States v. Finis P. Ernest, Inc., 509 F.2d 1256 (7th Cir. 1975).
Las Vegas Merchant Plumbers Ass'n v. United States, 210 F.2d 732 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 817 (1954); see, e.g., Doctors, Inc. v. Blue Cross, 490 F.2d 48 (3d
Cir. 1973). The necessity that the effect be substantial may be called the "de minimis"
test. See note 28 supra.
11 United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfrs. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949). See
note 27 supra.
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Clayton Act § 7: A Jurisdictional Retreat.
Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits corporate acquisitions or
mergers that may lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly.
In order to establish jurisdiction under this statute, both the acquired
and the acquiring corporations must be "engaged in commerce.""6 In
United States v. American Building Maintenance Industries
(ABMI), 57 the Supreme Court considered whether the "engaged in
commerce" language of § 7 was susceptible to an "affecting com-
merce" interpretation." By ruling that the respondent's acquisition
56 The pertinent part of § 7 of the Clayton Act provides:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire directly or indi-
rectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and
no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Com-
mission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another
corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of commerce
in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970),formerly ch. 323, § 7,38 Stat. 731 (1914). Section 7 of the Clayton
Act was amended in 1950 by the Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7 (1970),
formerly ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950).
- 95 S. Ct. 2150 (1975).
m There had been no discernible confusion or conflict over the "engaged in com-
merce" requirement of § 7 of the Clayton Act. Nor was there an apparent split in the
lower courts over whether § 7 can reach corporations whose intrastate activities affect
interstate commerce. In general, the issue has been so closed that there is little case
law on the subject. The attitude of the court in Page v. Work, 290 F.2d 323 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 875 (1961) apparently is the attitude silently adopted by other
courts:
In our view, the language of Section 18 [§ 7] in no way indicates
that Congress intended to apply the provisions of that Act to purely
local activities wholly directed to a local intrastate market and relat-
ing to a product not in the flow of interstate commerce and where the
effects on interstate activities in which the parties engage are insub-
stantial, inconsequential and fortuitous, if not non-existent.
290 F.2d at 333.34. Other courts and agencies have at least mentioned the "engaged
in commerce" requirement, and it has been seen as requiring an "in commerce" test
as opposed to an "affecting" commerce test. See, e.g., Treadway Co. v. Brunswick
Corp., 364 F. Supp. 316 (D.N.J. 1973); United States v. Citizens Publishing Co., 280
F. Supp. 978 (D. Ariz.), aff'd, 393 U.S. 911 (1968); A.B.T. Sightseeing Tours, Inc. v.
Gray Lines N.Y. Tours Corp., 242 F. Supp. 365 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Bailey's Bakery, Ltd.
v. Continental Baking Co., 235 F. Supp. 705 (D. Hawaii, 1964), afl'd, 401 F.2d 182
(1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1086 (1969); Foremost Dairies, Inc., 60 F.T.C. 944 (1962).
For a discussion of the "engaged in commerce" requirement of § 7 of the Clayton Act,
see 16A J. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTrRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 16.03[1] (1975).
See alsb E. KINTNER, PIUMER ON THE LAW OF MERGERS 201 (1973) which recognizes the
"in" commerce requirement of § 7, but states that the restriction is more apparent
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of the Benton companies, providers of janitorial services, was not
within the jurisdiction of § 7, the ABMI Court restricted this statute
to its literal meaning and held that the "affecting commerce" doc-
trine did not apply to it.
ABMI, the acquiring corporation, was one of the largest suppliers
of janitorial services in the United States, with branches in over 500
locations. The acquired corporations, the Benton companies, sup-
plied janitorial services to customers in Southern California. Al-
though the Benton companies' service contracts were performed in
California, many of their customers were engaged in interstate com-
merce.59 Nevertheless, the Benton companies used no national adver-
tising and made only "negligible" use of interstate communications. 0
Moreover, the labor intensive nature of the Benton companies'
janitorial service required few interstate products." In fact, the labor
required was hired totally from within Southern California.6 2 Due to
these intrastate aspects of the acquired corporations' business, the
Court found them not "engaged in commerce" for purposes of § 7 of
the Clayton Act.
In rejecting the government's argument that the Benton compa-
nies were "engaged in commerce," the Court ruled that such lan-
guage required application of the restrictive "flow of commerce '63
than real, for any sales or purchases across a state line will qualify a corporation as
"engaged in commerce."
11 95 S. Ct. at 2158.
1 95 S. Ct. at 2153. The Benton companies had made 10 interstate phone calls
worth $19.78 in the 18 months before the acquisition. Approximately 200 interstate
letters were sent or received in a similar period, a large number of which were from
government agencies such as the Internal Revenue Service. Id. at 2153 n.3.
" Many of the supplies purchased by the acquired corporations were manufac-
tured out of state, but almost all were bought locally. In the 16 months before the
acquisition, the Benton companies had purchased only $140 worth of supplies from out
of state sellers. 95 S. Ct. at 2153 n.4.
62 95 S. Ct. at 2153.
61 As in the "state line" test of Copp Paving, a "flow of commerce" test requires
the sale of a good or service across a state line. However, an activity can be within the
flow of commerce and not satisfy the "state line" test. An interstate activity can be a
part of a larger interstate flow of commerce without crossing a state line. In United
States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947), the Court held the service of driving a
passenger from one interstate railroad terminal to another as a part of his interstate
journey to be an activity in the flow of commerce. See Eiger, The Commerce Element
in Federal Antitrust Litigation, 25 FED. B.J. 282 (1965).
Yellow Cab is an example of an intrastate activity in the middle of a flow of
commerce being held within the flow. However, an activity involving either the produc-
tion of a good on one end or its distribution on the other end of its sale process can
also be within the "flow of commerce." Id. See 16 J. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS
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test, rather than the more liberal "affecting commerce test." 4 This
conclusion rested upon the Court's finding that the phrase "engaged
in commerce" represented Congress's intent to limit the jurisdic-
tional scope of § 7.11 In addition to the difference between the wording
of § 7 and the "affecting commerce" statutes," the inference that
Congress intended less than a full expression of its constitutional
commerce clause power in § 7 rested on two arguments. First, Copp
Paving provided a recent precedent for interpreting the phrase "en-
gaged in commerce." 7 The Court therefore argued that the construc-
tion given the phrase in Copp Paving required a similar construction
for § 7.11
AND TRADE REGULATION § 5.01[2] (1975). In ABMI, the key issue was whether the
supplies that the Benton companies purchased in California were within the flow. They
were manufactured out of state and sold intrastate by local distributors. If the Benton
companies had specifically requested the distributor to order the out of state supplies,
the goods would not have completed their intended interstate journey until they
reached the corporations. The corporations would thus be engaged in the flow of com-
merce. However, where goods are ordered by a retailer or distributor for general inven-
tory purposes only and not in response to a specific customer's needs, the goods are
held to have come to rest at the distributor and there to lose their interstate nature.
Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320 (1967); Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. 564
(1943). This was the holding in ABMI.
" See note 27 supra.
Is 95 S. Ct. at 2156. The Court also dismissed the government's contention that
the "engaged in commerce" language should be coextensive with the plenary exercise
of the constitutional commerce power as expressed in the Sherman Act and thus reach
corporations which affect commerce. The Court found the language of the Sherman
Act in § 1 directed to effects on commerce, while § 7 contained no similar concern. 95
S. Ct. at 2155. This is the same type of textual analysis that the Court used to reach
the same conclusion relating to § 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act. The "restraint of
trade" language in the Sherman Act appears to have persuaded the Court that it
means a broader scope was intended than merely "trade or commerce among the
several States."
" Compare Sherman Act § 1 with Clayton Act § 7. See notes 26 & 56 supra.
17 The Court did not reach the "in commerce" jurisdictional issue of § 7 in Copp
Paving because no showing was made of any effect on commerce. The Court was firm
on the scope of its opinion in regard to the commerce requirement of § 7. "In any event,
this case does not present an occasion to decide the question." 419 U.S. at 202. Having
defined only the jurisdiction of § 2(a) of the Clayton Act as amended by the Robinson-
Patman Act, the Court thus created interest in the question of whether the decision
applied to all sections of the Clayton Act.
" The language in the two statutes is not the same, and any analogy, therefore,
is suspect. The jurisdictional requirement of Robinson-Patman Act § 2(a) in question
in Copp Paving was whether any of the purchases involved in the discrimination were
"in commerce." The Court was not concerned with whether any corporation was "en-
gaged in commerce," the first jurisdictional requirement.
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The second argument the Court used to justify restricting § 7 to
the "flow of commerce" test was related to the use of that phrase as
a term of art. When § 7 was amended in 19509 the phrase "engaged
in commerce" had previously been construed for § 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act (FTCA) ° in FTC v. Bunte Bros., Inc. 71 In
that case, the Supreme Court limited the jurisdiction of FTCA § 5
to activities "in" commerce, and specifically excluded those which
merely "affected" commerce." In ABMI, the Court ruled that Bunte
Bros. transformed the phrase "engaged in commerce" into a term of
art with a clearly defined meaning.73 Pursuant to this premise the
11 Prior to 1950, § 7 only prohibited stock acquisitions by corporations. Section 7
was amended to prohibit acquisitions by purchasing the assets of another company.
The section was also amended to make it clear that § 7 was to reach beyond the
Sherman Act to potential lessenings of competition. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,
370 U.S. 294 (1962). The House and Senate reports make it clear that a major concern
in amending § 7 was to emphasize that § 7 should reach incipient Sherman Act
violations. The Senate report is definite on this point:
The committee wish to make it clear that the bill is not intended to
revert to the Sherman Act test. The intent here . . . is to cope with
monopolistic tendencies in their incipiency and well before they have
attained such effects as would justify a Sherman Act proceeding.
S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1950). The Congress was thus interested in
the very area at issue here, the scope of the effectiveness of § 7 of the Clayton Act.
For a thorough legislative history of § 7, see Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the
Merging of Law and Economics, 74 HAnv. L. REv. 226 (1960); Handler & Robinson, A
Decade of Administration of the Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act, 61 COLUM. L. REV.
629 (1961); Note, Section 7 of the Clayton Act: A Legislative History, 52 CoLuM. L.
REV. 766 (1952).
10 The pertinent at the time of ABMI provided:
Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in commerce, are declared unlawful.
Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 45 (1970). Pub. L. No. 93-637, § 201(a) (Jan. 4, 1975) amended § 5 to read:
Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby de-
clared unlawful.
Id. (emphasis added).
71 312 U.S. 349 (1941). The Court stated that this comparison was valid as both
acts were passed by the Sixty-Third Congress and both were designed to deal with the
same problem-the protection of free competition in the marketplace.
712 FTCA § 5 was limited by its terms to unfair methods of competition "in com-
merce." See note 70 supra. Bunte Bros. held that this limited the jurisdiction of § 5 to
activities "in" commerce and rejected the "affecting commerce" doctrine. However,
as with reliance on Robinson-Patman Act § 2(a), an analogy with § 5 is suspect. FTCA
§ 5 refers to unfair methods of competition, i.e., particular activities, "in commerce,"
not corporations "engaged in commerce." See note 68 supra.
73 Whether "engaged in commerce" was a term of art is debatable. If it is to be
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Court concluded that the drafters of the Celler-Kefauver amendment
to § 7 must have been aware that the words "engaged in commerce"
had only the meaning given them in Bunte Bros.4 The Bunte Bros.
case thus became the basis for the ABMI Court's conclusion that
Congress intended to restrict § 7's jurisdictional scope. In effect, the
Court reasoned that Bunte Bros. notified Congress that the words
"engaged in commerce" had a special meaning. 5 Although the ABMI
opinion referred to statutes passed prior to 1950 as evidence that
Congress recognized the significance of the "engaged in commerce"
language," the Court had no positive evidence that Congress in fact
considered Bunte Bros.77 while drafting the Celler-Kefauver amend-
ment." Therefore, the causal nexus between Bunte Bros. and the
considered a term of art, it should not, theoretically, be compared with other similar
yet not identical phrases such as "in commerce," as used in § 2(a) of the Robinson-
Patman Act. If "engaged in commerce" is to be regarded as a term of art, then applica-
tion of the Court's reasoning in Copp Paving with the phrase "engaged in commerce"
in § 7 is inappropriate. The same would be true for comparisons to § 5 of the FTCA
which also refers to "in commerce" and not "engaged in commerce."
11 The Court's statement in Bunte Bros. was direct, demanding a "clearer man-
date from Congress." 312 U.S. 349, 355 (1941). When Congress altered the commerce
language in § 5, effectively overruling Bunte Bros., it showed a congressional recogni-
tion of the difference between "in" and "affecting" commerce. However, as § 5 of the
FTCA was not amended until 1975, Congress cannot be charged with awareness of the
difference until 1975, not in 1950 as the Court claimed in ABMI.
71 The Court looked to the commerce requirement language in congressional acts
passed prior to 1950 and decided that Congress had been aware of the difference. For
example, § 10(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 453, as amended, 29
U.S.C. § 160(a) (1970), speaks of preventing unfair labor practices "affecting com-
merce." Similarly, the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937, ch. 127, 50 Stat. 72, provided for
certain regulations of transactions, "in or directly affecting interstate commerce in
bituminous coal." Id. at 76.
However, these Acts only show that Congress had at best constructive notice of
the Court's different treatment of "in" and "affecting" commerce. Nowhere in the
legislative history of § 7 is there a statement that reflects actual notice or awareness
of the commerce requirement's scope as it was being used in that section. Arguably
not only was Congress not aware of it, Justice Douglas was not aware of it in Moore v.
Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1954). See note 79 infra. In fact, if the Court
itself had taken an unambiguous stand on the reading of the words "engaged in com-
merce" Copp Paving might never have arisen. See note 11 supra.
"' Cases such as Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) and
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) enunciated the principle that
different jurisdictional tests would apply depending on the commerce language used
in an act. However, the validity of referring to the history of § 5 of the FTCA may be
questioned. See note 74 supra.
7 See note 75 supra.
18 Congress's awareness of the difference between "in" and "affecting" commerce
is measured in terms of its recognition of the difference in 1950. When Congress
19761
198 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXIH
wording of § 7 was not a factual one. Rather, the ABMI Court appears
to have concluded that Congress should have been aware that Bunte
Bros. gave the phrase "engaged in commerce" a special meaning.79
This position, in effect, held Congress to a standard of constructive
notice.
While relying most heavily on the literal meaning of § 7, the
precedent of Copp Paving,"0 and the constructive notice given by
Bunte Bros.,"' the Court in ABMI also rejected the government's
amended the section in 1950 it should have been aware of how the Court then would
interpret the language, and draft the section accordingly.
" In light of the Court's implied consideration of "in commerce" as a term of art
in ABMI, the equivocal nature of its decision in Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348
U.S. 115 (1954) is of interest. The hesitancy and vague language of the Court in Moore
did not settle the question of the scope of "in commerce" as used in § 2(a) of the
Robinson-Patman Act. If, as the Court argued in ABMI, Congress and the Court were
supposed to have recognized "in commerce" as a term of art by 1950, the Court could
have relied on this fact clearly to decide the issue in Moore. Instead of using an
argument based on this "known" meaning of the "term of art," they presented an
opinion that was not finally comprehended until after Copp Paving. Why it did not
rely on this theory in 1954 to decide Moore was not explained, yet the Court used this
theory in ABMI to charge Congress with knowledge of the meaning of "in commerce"
in 1950.
60 Relying on Copp Paving, the Court asserted that "engaged in commerce" is not
satisfied by the broad "affecting commerce" doctrine. 95 S. Ct. at 2154. The Court in
Copp Paving held that "in commerce" required more than an "effect" on commerce,
but rather involved interstate markets and distribution. However, as Copp Paving
construed a different statutory phrase than ABMI, total reliance on Copp Paving is
suspect. See note 68 supra. Furthermore, the decision in Copp Paving was not without
some criticism. Justice Douglas dissented in Copp Paving on the meaning of "engaged
in commerce" in § 2(a) and said that the same reasons held for his dissent in ABML
95 S. Ct. at 2159. The chiefdefect in the dissent is that it failed to counter the Court's
arguments. Justice Douglas referred to the legislative intent of § 7 but never reached
the real commerce requirement issue. The broad reading he urged was to comply with
the intended broad scope of the Act, which was to reach incipient Sherman Act viola-
tions. However, the Act by its terms can reach incipient violations of the Sherman Act,
and thus achieves its intended purpose.
"1 The Court's comparison of § 7 with § 5 of the FTCA is arguably inappropriate
for consideration in light of the Court's emphatic refusal to consider an analogy be-
tween § 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act and the FLSA in Copp Paving. If a common
purpose is sufficient to allow an analogy, then this same argument should permit
analogy of § 7 to Sherman Act § 1. Section 7 of the Clayton Act was enacted to
supplement the Sherman Act and reach incipient violations. S. REP. No. 1775, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1950); H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949). As § 7 is to
supplement the Sherman Act, the purpose of each act is the prevention of restraints
on competition in commerce. The analogy should thus be valid.
The logic the Court used to justify the analogy of § 5 of the FTCA to § 7 of the
Clayton Act also would suggest that the proposed analogy of § 1 of the Sherman Act
to § 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act in Copp Paving should have been accepted.
ANTITRUST JURISDICTION
argument that limiting § 7 to the "flow of commerce" test would
reduce its effectiveness. That both the FTC and the Government had
previously prosecuted only those acquisitions in which both the ac-
quired and the acquiring corporations were directly engaged in com-
merce proved to the Court that its holding in ABMI would not frus-
trate the remedial purpose of § 7. In finding no precedent for extend-
ing the scope of § 7 beyond the "flow of commerce" doctrine,82 how-
ever, the Court at least arguably neglected one of its own earlier
rulings. In United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co.83 the Court held
a joint venture corporation not yet in operation to lie within the scope
of § 7 due to its probable participation in interstate commerce."4 Even
though the acquired corporation was not literally "engaged in com-
merce" the Penn-Olin Court held that § 7 applied to the stock acquis-
ition. Both parent corporations were engaged in commerce and the
Court therefore found that the acquired joint venture was designed
to compete in interstate markets. In order to accommodate what it
found to be Congress's purpose in enacting § 7, the Penn-Olin Court
was willing to expand the "engaged in commerce" formula beyond
the limits of the "flow of commerce" doctrine. The rule of ABMI
ignored Penn-Olin as precedent for a liberal interpretation of the
phrase "engaged in commerce."
While the government's main argument in ABMI was that § 7
permitted an "affecting commerce" analysis, it also argued that the
particular characteristics of the Benton companies placed them
within even the restrictive "flow of commerce" test. This argument
was premised on the fact that the Benton companies derived eighty
to ninety percent of their revenue from interstate concerns., The
Court dismissed the argument, however, stating that to be "engaged
in commerce" the acquired corporation itself must be directly in-
Arguably, both Acts aimed at the same goal-the prevention of discrimination which
restrains commerce.
"I The Government relied on United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270
(1966) as an example of a § 7 challenge to an acquisition of local corporations that only
affected interstate commerce and was thus "engaged in commerce." However, accord-
ing to the Supreme Court, the district court had expressly found that the acquired
grocery stores were directly in commerce as each purchased more than 51% of its
supplies from out of state. 95 S. Ct. at 2157 n.8.
378 U.S. 158 (1964).
378 U.S. at 168. However, the Court stated that as the acquired corporation was
at the time of trial "engaged in commerce," jurisdiction was present. Thus, the Court
arguably based jurisdiction on the corporation's activities at the time of trial and not
at the time of the acquisition.
91 95 S. Ct. at 2158 n.9.
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volved in the production, sale, or acquisition of goods or services in
interstate commerce. Because the labor intensive nature of their serv-
ice product insulated them from interstate markets, ABMI held that
the Benton companies were not "in the flow of commerce" for § 7
purposes, 6 even though they might have had an effect on interstate
commerce.
Beyond casting doubt on the rule of Penn-Olin, ABMIwould seem
to have three effects on § 7's ability to restrain undesirable mergers.
First, the policy of stopping undesirable stock or asset acquisitions in
their incipiency" might be less effective. Section 7 of the Clayton Act
prohibits acquisitions which "might tend" to lessen competition. An
acquisition, then, need not directly lessen competition to violate § 7,
but must only have a tendency to do so. Consequently the mere size
of the acquired corporation is not necessarily a valid index of its
market significance. Small corporations may become market leaders
through the exertion of vigorous entreprenurial skill or the possession
of unique and valued patents. In spite of their size and the number
of their interstate transactions, such independent market leaders are
essential to an open and competitive market." At least at their incep-
"The Court used Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co.,
334 U.S. 219 (1948) as an example of a flow of commerce test. In Mandeville, the Court
found a restraint on the sale of sugar beets to be a restraint on the interstate sale of
refined sugar, as it was a restraint on a portion of a long, continuous interstate transac-
tion. The Benton companies' sales of services to the interstate corporation, however,
are not such a part of one long transaction. While the janitorial services may affect
the corporation's interstate dealings, they are not a part or process of the production
or sale of any goods or services.
" This is the recognized policy of Clayton Act § 7. Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 333-34 (1962). While a small acquisition may not be a present
restraint on commerce, and hence not be a Sherman Act violation, it can be a § 7
Clayton Act violation. Section 7 only requires a possible lessening of competition.
"[T]he very wording of § 7 requires a prognosis of the probable future effect of the
merger." 370 U.S. at 332 (footnote omitted). See S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1950); H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949); Oppenheim, Guides to Har-
monizing Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act with the Sherman and
Clayton Acts, 59 MICH. L. REv. 821, 825 (1961).
" Judge Learned Hand stated in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148
F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945):
Throughout the history of these [antitrust] statutes it has been con-
stantly assumed that one of their purposes was to perpetuate and
preserve, for its own sake and in spite of possible cost, an organization
of industry in small units which can effectively compete with each
other.
148 F.2d at 429. The Supreme Court also recognized that the Celler-Kefauver Amend-
ment was to protect small locally owned businesses even if it resulted in higher prices.
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962).
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tion such small corporations are unlikely to have extensive interstate
connections. The effect of ABMI is thus to place purely intrastate
corporations beyond the protection of § 7 whether or not their acquisi-
tion by a larger competitor would limit competition. Thus, if it is not
"engaged in commerce" within the ABMI definition, a small market
leader could be acquired with § 7 impunity.89
The second effect of ABMI is to exempt labor intensive service
industries from § 7 protection. In addition to the janitorial service
industry, industrial maintenance firms, accounting firms, nursing
homes, engineering firms, secretarial supply services and hospitals,
among others, will find no legal protection against a competitor's
take-over bid. Thus, ABMI arguably facilitates entry into local
service industry markets by either large competitors or financial
conglomerates.
A third conspicuous result of ABMI is to create different jurisdic-
tional standards for the two types of acquisitions prohibited by § 7.
Clayton Act § 7 prohibits both stock and asset acquisitions which
tend to lessen competition. While stock acquisitions are within the
jurisdictional scope of § 7 only when both the acquired and acquiring
corporations are "engaged in commerce," in the case of asset acquisi-
tions, § 7 jurisdiction is proper if the acquiring corporation is "subject
to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission."9 Since the
FTCA has recently been amended to adopt the "affecting commerce"
doctrine,9" an acquiring corporation need only affect interstate com-
merce to come within the purview of § 7. The combined effect of
" This fear may be exaggerated. Over the years, courts have been able to label a
business "in commerce" with relative ease where it has been desired. Any retail outlet
that buys from out of state will be easy prey for an "engaged in commerce" label.
United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947); Page v. Work, 290 F.2d 323 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 875 (1961); Treadway Co. v. Brunswick Corp., 364 F. Supp.
316 (D.N.J. 1973); A.B.T. Sightseeing Tours, Inc. v. Gray Lines N.Y. Tours Corp., 242
F. Supp. 365 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). However, a certain tempering of the doctrine that a
purchase in interstate commerce makes the buyer "in commerce" was voiced by the
court in Lieberthal v. North Country Lanes, Inc., 332 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1964). In
Lieberthal, the court refused to find that the incidental flow of supplies into an intras-
tate enterprise makes that enterprise interstate in character:
It has frequently been held, however, that the incidental flow of sup-
plies in interstate commerce, . . . [does] not in themselves suffice to
transform .n essentially intrastate activity into an interstate enter-
prise.
Id. at 271 (citations omitted). Thus, there is some sentiment for a substantiality test,
as was found in cases relating to § 1 of the Sherman Act. See note 28 supra.
" Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
" See note 70 supra.
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ABMI and the amended FTCA, therefore, makes asset acquisitions
more susceptible to § 7 challenges than stock acquisitions. Since
there is no basis in the history of § 7, or antitrust policy, for this
distinction, it must be treated as an anomaly.
Thus, ABMI restricts the effectiveness of § 7 while it gives that
statute confusing and anomalous jurisdictional tests. In light of these
results, congressional action would appear not only desirable but
highly probable.
Conclusion
In Copp Paving, Goldfarb and ABMI, the Supreme Court ex-
panded the jurisdictional scope of one antitrust statute while con-
tracting the jurisdictional range of two "others. Such changes in juris-
dictional tests may cause practical complications for enforcement of
the antitrust laws. These court-made changes in the jurisdiction of
the antitrust statutes complicate the plaintiff's burden of deciding
what facts must be alleged to satisfy the demands of a particular
statute. Furthermore, the lack of uniformity among the jurisdictional
standards for the several antitrust statutes might force a plaintiff to
choose a statute for the certainty of its jurisdiction rather than the
precision of its application to the facts of his case. If some overriding
antitrust policy were served by separate jurisdictional tests for the
different statutes, the complexity produced by Copp Paving,
Goldfarb and ABMI could be more easily rationalized. However, the
Court did not attribute such changes to antitrust policy considera-
tions. Rather, the Court preferred to examine each case on its facts
and reach its decisions with little discussion of the practical ramifica-
tions of each holding.92 As a result, the expanded Sherman Act juris-
diction is unrelated to the gaps created in the jurisdiction of § 2(a)
and § 7.1
3
By disregarding antitrust policy as a factor in its rulings, the
Supreme Court has created lacunae in the pattern of antitrust en-
forcement. The holding in Copp Paving appears to encourage the use
of interstate profits to support intrastate price wars. This effectively
gives financial size rather than entrepreneurial skill a competitive
92 See text accompanying notes 22-24, 52-55 & 87-91 supra.
,3 Section 1 of the Sherman Act can prevent a merger if it can be proved to be a
restraint of trade or an attempt to monopolize. However, the Sherman Act requires
proof of a present restraint, while Clayton Act § 7 requires merely a possible future
lessening of competition. See note 87 supra. Thus, while a merger could violate either
Act, the evidentiary requirements make the Sherman Act less effective. The Senate
Report emphasized this difference in evidentiary requirements. See note 69 supra.
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advantage. Furthermore, by strategically locating sales outlets away
from state boundary lines, interstate corporations can engage in price
discrimination without satisfying the jurisdiction of § 2(a).
Likewise, the ruling in ABMI has created fissures in antitrust law.
The incipiency standard of Clayton Act § 7 has been rendered ineffec-
tual in cases of corporations which "affect" commerce but are not
"in" commerce." Prior to ABMI, small innovative market leaders
were protected by § 7 due to their potential effect on interstate mar-
kets. However, ABMI permits such corporations to be absorbed by
acquisition or merger before they can become a competitive influence
in the interstate marketplace. In addition, labor intensive corpora-
tions are also more susceptible to acquisition.
Section 2 of the Clayton Act95 encourages one to think in terms of
a unified body of antitrust law. Yet "antitrust law" is a mixture of
diverse and complicated statutes. The cumulative effect of Copp
Paving, Goldfarb and ABMI increases the confusion surrounding the
jurisdiction of these supposedly similar statutes. The Court's failure
to consider antitrust policy in these recent decisions is a partial cause
of the increasing diffraction of antitrust jurisdictional tests. Without
a major congressional overhaul of the "antitrust laws," however, this
unfortunate trend appears likely to continue."
WILLIAM S. GEE
LAWRENCE CALDWELL MELTON
" There is little doubt that § 1 of the Sherman Act will not reach the small,
cumulative acquisitions that § 7 was designed to combat. It is § 7s ability to reach
the small individual lessenings of competition that sets it apart from § 1 of the Sher-
man Act. See note 87 supra.
15 U.S.C. § 12 (1970).
" Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970), is a statute that may be
subject to the narrow jurisdictional tests that the Court set out in Copp Paving and
ABM. Whether Copp Paving's holding applied to § 3 was left undecided by the
Supreme Court. 419 U.S. at 201.
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